by a summit-level meeting in 1989 between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping and full normalization of relations.
The newly independent Russian Federation, facing a series of problems that threatened to tear a unified-Russia apart, had a limited capacity to project their influence throughout most of the former-Soviet Union (Kozyulin 2014) . With the replacement of the pro-western Foreign Minister Kozyrev with a former KGB director, Yevgeny Primakov, Russian foreign policy took a turn towards Asia.
Primakov, a strategic mind shaped by his Cold War service in the KGB, correctly saw Asia and more specifically, China as a rising power that, if managed carefully, could limit U.S. and NATO encroachment into the traditional Russian sphere of influence (Carlsson, Oxenstierna, and Weissmann 2015) . It was during this immediate postSoviet period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) ) that trade, specifically in defense systems increased.
Defense was a win-win for both, Moscow needed foreign currency to keep its strategic defense industries afloat, and China, under the weight of Western arms sanctions stemming from the Tiananmen Square Massacre, needed to modernize its outmoded military (Carlsson, Oxenstierna, and Weissmann 2015) . Growing concerns of NATO enlargement eastward dovetailed with Beijing's antagonistic perceptions of U.S. hegemony on the world stage created the conditions for the signing a strategic partnership in 1996, one that is emphasizes "...equality, mutual confidence, and mutual coordination" (Permanent Representatives of China and the Russian pursued an economic strategic initiative, the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), that has seen massive Chinese foreign direct investments across the former Soviet-space. China's engagement with states critical to Russian security interests have undoubtedly led to unease in Moscow. What is clear in the recent history of the Sino-Russian relationship is that while both sides have made progress: normalizing and delimiting borders in the 1990s, countering U.S. hegemony, increasing bilateral trade, and promoting connectivity in Central Asia, these "successes" bely critical points of tension discussed below, that if not managed could have a destabilizing effect on the relationship's trajectory.
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REVIEW OF ACADEMIC LITERATURE
Facing an increasingly inhospitable West, Russia's "pivot to Asia" has reignited debate in the Sino-Russian relationship. Until Putin's third presidential term, most Western analyses were relatively skeptical of a mutually beneficial SinoRussian relationship due to long-held Russian strategic concerns of a rising China encroaching on Russia's Near Abroad. Most claimed that the "strategic partnership"
was none more than temporary or incidental (Lo 2008) . Rooted in traditional greatpower balancing, this view argued that while both countries saw increased bilateral trade and an increase in mutual connections, Moscow in the long-run would ultimately be unwilling to accept a China as an equal. Furthermore, given the Kremlin's reliance on relations with the former Soviet Union to substantiate its "Great Power" status, increasing Chinese influence in Central Asia would necessitate a strong reaction from the Kremlin. Great-power balancing underscores Russia's perennial trepidations over its perceived strategic weaknesses vis-à-vis China, primarily its expansive and underpopulated frontier. Domestically, these concerns play into growing xenophobia against Chinese-funded projects and Chinese nationals working in the Russian Far East. Importantly, while fear of outside influence and encirclement are a constant in Russia's strategic thinking, these fears are equally shared by China.
In addition, within a certain group of Russian and Chinese academics there is a strain that seems to take the often-flowery diplomatic statements at face value.
Attempting to incite fears of an "Anti-American axis" on the Eurasian peninsula, this perspective has not gained much traction beyond government-funded propaganda outlets like Russia Today and China Times. What couldn't be anticipated at that time was events in Ukraine that led to a rapid deterioration of relations with the West. building from the previously mentioned perspectives. While Yu-Shan Wu conveniently denominates this bifurcation as between the "doubters" and "believers" of the "robustness regime", this essay terms them as "pessimists" and "optimists".
Moving beyond the temporary partnership concept, most contemporary Western thinking falls into the pessimist camp, emphasizing that economic and political asymmetries will become a stronger driving force in the relationship, giving way to potential challenges in the long run. Contemporary pessimists understand the current partnership to be based on common regional security and economic interests, as well as countering perceived U.S. hegemony in the international order.
Ambassador William Courtney in a Rand commentary, frames the issue in terms of 'durability', asking the question, "how durable is the China-Russia 'Friendship'?" While Ambassador Courtney rules out both an all-out collapse and any form of formal alliance, he argues a more nuanced point, that uncertainties, primarily in Russia could limit bilateral engagement "…given the two nations' differing trajectories and historical grievances" (Courtney et al 2015) . It is important to note that this view does not perceive Sino-Russian engagement as simply an "Axis of
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Convenience", rather the strategic relationship has picked all of the low-hanging fruit and is beginning to confront both internal and external pressures that could stymie future developments, especially in light of a Russia's deteriorating position.
Regarding ideological convergence, Peter Baev points to increasingly incompatible perspectives of international order, especially Russia's diminutive role in China's 'evolving' concept of global order (Baev 2016). Baev argues that while both states have articulated their interests in a multi-polar order, the emerging Chinese economic and security architecture will undoubtedly challenge Russia's hegemonic role in their Near Abroad. As Russia identifies its Near Abroad as critical to its national security, any direct challenges from China would negatively impact their bilateral relationship.
"Believers" on the other hand emphasize that drivers propelling the two powers together will remain strong enough to prevent previously mentioned asymmetries from pulling it apart. This view particularly focuses in on the role of the What is clear is that the Sino-Russian relationship no longer resembles a temporary partnership based on convenience, nor is it a full-fledged alliance or ideological "Anti-American" axis. Today it is best characterized as a relatively stable strategic partnership, that sees coordination in certain areas, particularly economic, defense, and institutional development in Central Asia. However, while these are
important pillars in the relationship, they are beginning to face increasing stresses.
At this point, Russia has little room for maneuver beyond strengthening its ties with China. Russia is confronting a new Post-Cold War reality, where it is increasingly dependent on China for economic growth and as a security partner in its Near Abroad. As multiple authors have pointed out, this strategic pivot to China has not seen the level of success their mutual laudatory statements reflect (Baev 2016; Eder 2014; Eder and Huotari 2016) . Analyzing these areas of coordination, it soon becomes clear that the Sino-Russian relationship has shown itself to be resilient but whether this condition will continue depends on how both sides manage increasingly asymmetrical aspects of the relationship.
STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS -DRIVERS
As Miles Law states, "where you stand depends on where you sit", therefore it is important to understand what factors inform Russian and Chinese decisionmakers decisions and how they perceive their position in the world. Interestingly, while both states share a common sense of insecurity in their strategic environments, there is a striking difference in how they perceive their own power and how to best wield it to achieve their foreign policy objectives.
Both Russia and China's perception of constant insecurity is steeped in long histories of foreign invasion emanating from their expansive and relatively unpopulated frontiers abutting unstable regions. On this point George Kennan in his "Long Telegram" attributes "the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs" to "…insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomad peoples." The frontier regions are especially sensitive to both Moscow and Beijing due to not only their geo-strategic significance but also their potential mineral wealth. Oil and gas deposits provide both states with an contemporary Russia is in a terminal decline. Russia's relevance as a great power exist really only in its strategic capabilities and its toeholds in Syria and Ukraine.
Russia wants to be seen as strong leader abroad, to divert attention away from failing domestic policies. Allen Lynch remarks that Putin's strategy, "…[is] to maintain the appearance of great power status abroad while most of the sinews of Russian power have withered into evanescence at home." As with the Soviet Union, international prestige does little to improve the daily lives of Russians scraping by in far-flung villages. Instead, the effective rhetorical use of Russia's great power status maintains Putin's grip on power and is essential for the continuation of his oligarchic regime.
While the goal of regime survival is similar to Moscow, buoyed by a thriving economy, Beijing has instead sought to cushion its rise. Preferring to 'hide its strength and bide its time', China seeks a place at the table to revise the rules of the international order and subsequently is less openly hostile, but is more opaque and insidious in its motives. As noted above, China has fervently developed multilateral institutions characterized by their reliance on Chinese capital and political will in addition to grandiose and vague strategic initiatives that besides 'raising all boats' will effectively transmute Beijing into an undisputable economic pole. There are however underlying concerns around Beijing's true intentions with their recent Tensions with the EU over Ukraine and EU dependence on Russian energy, have reenergized Brussels to diversify its energy suppliers. This development combined with soft international oil prices, aging oil and gas fields, and a dearth of
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Western financing and technical expertise has led to weak economic growth and a deep recession. Moscow is especially worried about losing ground in Europe as the continent accounts for more than 60% of oil exports and around 75% of natural gas exports; both accounting for over 43% of the federal budget (Henderson and Grushevenko 2017; Barden 2017).
On paper China seems like an ideal export market for Russian oil and gas, they share a long stable border and most importantly China has an insatiable appetite for energy. While Russia exports just under a million barrels per day (bpd) of oil to China it has only recently made tepid progress with China (Barden 2017). As of 2018, two parallel pipelines bring in crude oil from fields in Eastern Siberia.
Although oil has been a nascent bright spot, exports of gas has not fared as well. For decades neither side has been able to reach an agreeable price. Russia negotiates for long-term contracts charging a comparable European rate, whereas, China only wants to pay a subsidized domestic price (Eder 2014). There is a planned spur from the Gazprom-owned Power of Siberia pipeline that is expected to come online in 2019, but its long-term viability is uncertain (TASS 2017). Oil and gas pipeline negotiations only took off after Russian firms lost access to Western capital. China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) signed a series of agreements with Gazprom in 2014 on gas deliveries estimated to be worth over $400 billion, while Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) and state-run banks have taken significant stakes in While the situation in Afghanistan has stabilized for the moment, the seemingly inexorable rise of extremism undoubtedly puts pressure on China and
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Russia to further develop their security institutions to respond effectively to such potential threats. It logically follows that as both states identify extremism in Afghanistan as a common threat, a coordinated policy in Afghanistan would signify stronger mutual trust and institutional capabilities. However Beijing and Moscow seem to be pursuing separate approaches to security affairs in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Most telling, is that while China has a token information sharing center through the auspices of the SCO, it has instead preferred to pursue closer bilateral military-military relations in the region without involving Russia, going so far as to put 'boots on the ground' in Tajikistan.
NORMATIVE CONVERGENCE -A COMMON WORLDVIEW?
The final element in examining the Sino-Russian relationship is normative convergence, which takes the shape of elite restraint. Normative convergence promotes elite restraint, acting like glue, by holding together the relationship even after fissures begin to appear. These "institutions and norms induce strategic The narrative of norm convergence is further reinforced by both China and Russia pursuing foreign policies that are focused on developing a so-called ambitions to be realized, it must be seen as an equal with China.
CONCLUSION
The future of the Sino-Russian relationship depends heavily on how both sides manage growing economic, political, and regional asymmetries between Moscow and Beijing. This asymmetrical dynamic is best summarized by Swanström (2014), "[that] Russia may need China more than China needs Russia and Russia's main problem in maneuvering the relationship is its competitive weakness." In the shortto medium-run it is highly unlikely that this asymmetrical relationship will significantly deteriorate. China has been diligent in managing Moscow, especially in the aftermath of Western sanctions. Beijing clearly understands that for its regional ambitions to be realized it has to appease Moscow. This cautious approach highlights their more reticent engagement with Near Abroad states on matters of defense and intelligence. Furthermore, Beijing wants to keep Moscow as a partner and has been amenable to the Kremlin's recent interest in discussing a potential EAEU-BRI free- This goal recognizes the unique role that the U.S. has in the region as an outside balancing power, while also acknowledging that the U.S. does not have the wherewithal nor the intention to dominate the region itself. To accomplish this balance, the Trump Administration must engage on bilateral and multilateral
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initiatives that act to reassure traditional security partners, while providing Central Asian states with the necessary confidence to pursue independent foreign policies.
In addition, the U.S., China, and Russia share a common interest in a stable and prosperous Central Asia and Afghanistan and should engage closer with China on the BRI, taking advantage of Chinese claims of its inclusivity. In this effort the Trump Administration should seek to decouple the relationship. Russia's actions targeting the heart of American democracy and their increasingly threatening strategic posture must be met with overwhelming counterforce. The Trump Administration must call out Beijing for its unfair trade practices, using the World Trade Organization dispute mechanisms and if that fails turn to tariffs and targeted financial sanctions. Finally, the U.S. must provide a strong counternarrative to
